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A COLLOQUY WITH JACK GREENBERG 
ABOUT BROWN: EXPERIENCES AND 
REFLECTIONS 
Richard Sobel* 
This colloquy draws from conversations with Jack Greenberg 
about his experiences with and the significance of Brown v. Board 
of Education. The discussion between Greenberg and Richard 
Sobel took place during class in March 1995, as part of a seminar 
on civil rights law at Princeton University. A follow-up interview 
in May 1995 provided details on topics broached earlier. Edited 
together they provide intriguing insights into the historic case and 
Jack Greenberg's role. 
Jack Greenberg: Before and after class, Richard Sobel and I 
have been talking about some issues addressed here. And I 
thought it would be a better way of exploring some of the issues 
of Brown v. Board of Education,! some of the factors that are 
involved in it, if we would engage in a colloquy. And so he may 
ask questions and make observations, and we'll talk back and 
forth. I'm going to ask Professor Sobel to address some things 
that concern him, and then we'll have a colloquy. 
Richard Sobel: I think all of us are aware how historic the 
Brown decision is. As a historian and a political scientist, ques-
tions come to mind which other people have asked too. (I 
brought my precept from the history of law because the story of 
what's going on here is so important.) I want to get into history 
as I talk about it in my classes, as it comes at the time it's occur-
ring, and not just in retrospect. 
* Political scientist at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Uni-
versity; previously taught at Princeton University. For support of this project, he would 
like to thank Arnold Rampersad, Howard Taylor, Jean Washington and Hattie Black of 
the Afro-American Studies Program at Princeton University. He also appreciates the 
assistance in transcription, text editing and citations of Anna Abengowe, Allison Brown-
ell, Julie Cho, Arnal Dayaratna, Alison Ho, Yoon-hee Kim, and Eric Paras. Thanks, too, 
to Leigh Bienen, Hendrik Hartog and Larry Sager for suggestions. 
1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown I"); Brown v. Board 
of Education 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown II"). 
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I'd like to see if we could begin with some historic questions 
about what it was like at the time that Brown was being decided. 
If you look at the front of Crusaders in the Courtsz you see a 
much younger Jack Greenberg. And I'd like to try to take you 
back to that time. You talk in the book (p. 166) about how you 
had just been admitted [12/8/52] to practice before the Supreme 
Court. Can you give us some sense of how you felt the day that 
you went to the Supreme Court to argue your part of Brown v. 
Board of Education, though you'd also done some of the Kansas 
[case]?3 
JG: Well, these are important personal reflections that had, I 
think, no widespread political significance. I'm happy to answer 
your questions ... 
RS: But this is something that people are interested in. 
JG: I mentioned in the book that I'd been in the Supreme Court 
several times before (cf. p. 74). I had been there for argument in 
the Groveland case.4 I had been there for the argument of 
Sweatt5 and McLaurin.6 The first time I went into the Supreme 
Court-I am not a religious person and did not have a religious 
upbringing, but I felt as if I was walking into a synagogue and 
somehow I just didn't have my skull cap on. My personal reac-
tion was, for what it's worth, that I was in a holy place; that was 
my gut reaction. (p. 74) 
RS: How did you feel when you got there, when you actually 
had to stand up and address the Court [for the first time]? 
JG: "Was I scared? Was I frightened? Was I anxious?" The 
answer's no, I wasn't because we had rehearsed and rehearsed 
and rehearsed. I knew pretty much what I was going to say. The 
arguments had been rehearsed and rehearsed and rehearsed. It 
was not as if we walked in there and gave it for the first time. We 
had "dry runs." (p. 72) (I really think we were the first ones to do 
that, but before, Thurgood Marshall, Bill Hastie and Charles 
Houston used to have dress rehearsals in the basement of the 
Howard Law library. The next time I heard of it was when John 
2. Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts: How a Dedicated Band of Lawyers 
Fought for the Civil Rights Revolution (Basic Books, 1992) (page numbers in parentheses 
are citations to this book). 
3. The Brown case while it was still in the district courts of Kansas. Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (1951). 
4. A series of trials for four Black men convicted in the rape of a white woman in 
Groveland, Florida. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951). 
5. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
6. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
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F. Kennedy was debating Nixon on television [1960] and they put 
him through a dry run.) Having rehearsed it, people came up to 
me afterwards and said "Hey, that was really good." And I 
thought I was on top of it. (p. 174) 
RS: You said that you weren't nervous, but you didn't really say 
how you did feel. Can you recall what sort of emotions were 
going through your mind at the time that you were arguing this 
momentous case before the Court? 
JG: Well, I'll tell you what I do recall, and obviously I recall 
something. But I'm not very demonstrative externally or inter-
nally, and if I can liken it to something, I was on a ship that 
landed on Iwo Jima in the first wave [February 1945]. That's 
something that could be a pretty frightening experience. I just 
calmly did what I had to do. I just sort of stood there as some-
body was firing a gun, couldn't hear a word I was saying because 
it was making so much noise. 
It was not as if I had just been dropped in the middle of the 
case. This is something that I tried in a lower court, that I had 
argued in the Supreme Court of Delaware.7 I also tried the Kan-
sas case.s There were all sorts of rehearsals, dry runs, innumera-
ble conferences and discussions. I could have been, I think, 
nervous and panicked and had a variety of reactions. But this is 
something which had been rehearsed to a fare thee well; and so 
essentially the only thing that we had some concern about would 
have been some question that would take us by surprise ... 
RS: But do you remember anything about what you were feeling 
at that time? 
JG: I felt that I was doing what I had prepared to do, if you want 
me to intellectualize about it a little bit. I mean ... I was deeply 
committed to what I was doing ... I believed in it. 
RS: But do you remember feeling satisfaction, relief, boredom, 
anticipation? 
JG: Satisfaction, yes. As of the moment it turned out well. And 
certainly in the end it turned out well. Boredom, certainly not. I 
was sitting there [listening to] the story by [opposing counsel] 
John W. Davis about Aesop's fable of the dog with the bone. 
Instead of calling everything a fancy effort to attain prestige 
(p.190), that was to open some rhetorical trap that was not going 
to succeed, I felt satisfaction at scoring that point. 
7. See Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Chane. 1952). 
8. The Brown case before it reached the U.S. Supreme Court (cited in note 3). 
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There was also the feeling that you wondered what differ-
ence the arguments made. Whether or not you were being swept 
along by a historical tide and in a connection that eventually you 
assisted. And there were all those other cases; all these cases 
were separate cases, but it was really one big issue on a contin-
uum. This was just part of the bigger things that were going on 
for a long time. People looking at it from the outside saw this 
case, but we saw it as more globally, at least I did. Globally in 
the sense of being part of a larger effort, in the battle to acquire 
desegregated schools. I think the others did too. 
RS: Before the decision came down, how did you think the deci-
sion was going to go? 
JG: At different times, our guesses were different. We kept 
changing our estimates. When things began, we thought [Justice 
Robert H.] Jackson would be against us on the ground that he 
thought this was something that should have been done by Con-
gress. He was against segregation, had been a Nuremberg prose-
cutor, believed in human rights and civil rights, and he had 
written some very strong pro-civil rights opinions in related ar-
eas. But he felt something like this should have been done by 
Congress. We had heard that, and later, the examination of the 
records of the discussions in conference of the Court, indicate 
that that he strongly felt that way. But he went with the majority. 
We heard that [Justice Stanley F.] Reed was against us, that he 
thought it would stir up too much turmoil. 
We thought we would win, and we thought it would be 
something like 6-3 or 7-2, maybe at worst 5-4, but we would win. 
We had been through Sweatt and McLaurin, and the logic of 
those decisions which the Court had to appreciate at the time 
they handed those decisions down indicated that we would win. 
(p. 193) 
RS: How did you feel, what did you think, personally, and how 
did you feel after the decision came down [9-0]? 
JG: Well, I was outraged as a matter of principle that there was 
such a thing as segregation: it was totally insupportable. So I felt 
this was something that we had to win. And I felt that our argu-
ments were right in a legal, constitutional sense, for the reasons 
we set forth in our briefs. Didn't believe in all of the arguments 
in our briefs; some of the arguments on history, for example, 
were essentially defensive, trying to neutralize the argument 
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from the other side. The argument that Plessy9 was based upon 
social scientific assumptions: we knew at that time that they were 
false. Even though our own evidence had a lot of imperfections, 
still it was a matter of common sense. We knew that the purpose, 
as Charles Black said, of segregation was essentially to stigmatize 
Black people.w (pp. 120, 123) So I was a true believer. I felt 
that this was something we had to win. 
RS: And was the case something you were going to win? 
JG: Yes, we thought we were going to win. (p. 193) The only 
debate was would it be unanimous or would it be closer to 5-4. 
RS: How did you feel, personally, when the decision came down 
as it did? 
JG: We were all euphoric, obviously. I did not feel at that time, 
that this was going to be the end of it all. I think Thurgood [Mar-
shall] had said before the decision came down, that in "Georgia, 
there were 100 counties, we'll have to have 100 lawsuits." And I 
believed that was right, and I believed this [because that was] the 
experience we had with the universities and law schools. Not a 
single one of them capitulated without being sued. Even in the 
same state, to integrate the University of Texas, you'd have to 
sue all of the other branches, same thing in the other states. I felt 
there was going to be a long struggle. The "all deliberate speed" 
decision [Brown II in 1955] actually dismayed me as a matter of 
principle. But it didn't dismay me as something that was really 
going to slow things down, because I already thought it was going 
to slow things. (p. 206) 
RS: Once again, I want to ask what you, as an individual felt; do 
you remember how you felt when you learned that the decision 
had come in your favor, and in particular, had been unanimous? 
Please don't use we; I'm trying to get a view of you individually. 
JG: I first heard it individually because Thurgood called me in 
Washington. It was terrific, it was great. Again, I don't want to 
disappoint you when you say, "how do you feel." I was not hav-
ing a very emotional reaction. I just thought it was great, it was 
terrific. You know, we loved it. On that particular occasion, we 
did not have a big party, which was one of the very few times. In 
part, there was something of a personality conflict between 
9. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (18%). 
10. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale 
L.J. 421, 424 (1960). 
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Thurgood and Walter White who was trying to hog the spotlight 
and Thurgood sort of effaced himself ... 
RS: You say in the book, "It was all so awesome." (p. 199) 
JG: I guess that's true also. I mean, we had no idea what it 
meant. Would it be a magic wand? Everybody said would it be 
a revolutionary idea or wide resistance or no big deal. It was ... 
amazement, wonder, something very grand was happening out 
there. 
RS: In your book, (p. 121) you say the charge was made after the 
victory, that the school case rested on social science and not law. 
Can you point out, in the language of the Brown v. Board of 
Education decision, where you think the Court makes a defini-
tive statement that the 14th amendment prohibits separate 
schools? 
JG: (Reading from Brown v. Board of Education) "We conclude 
that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal' has no place." In public education, you can't have sepa-
rate schools. "Separate education facilities are inherently 
unequal." 
RS: This clearly says you cannot have separate schools. But 
where is the constitutional principle that says equal protection 
requires integration, or at least desegregation? 
JG: That very same sentence with the next sentence says that 
they were being deprived of equal protection of law guaranteed 
by the 14th amendment. 
RS: The Court does say it there, but what principle is the Court 
arguing there. . . ? 
JG: Is the Court arguing that you have to affirmatively integrate 
as they did in the Swann case?n Is that what you're talking 
about? Or is it enough that they've just taken away the barriers 
and let happen, come what may? 
RS: No. What is the legal argument that convinced the Court, or 
that the Court articulated, that says that the 14th amendment 
guarantees equal protection by having integrated schools, that 
segregation is unconstitutional on the basis of separate but equal, 
that there is another affirmative constitutional principle? 
JG: I think I see what you're driving at, that there's a partial 
difference in concept, at least from one perspective, between the 
11. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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abolition of segregation and the requirement of affirmative inte-
gration. The Court here said that you may not segregate, but it 
did not say that you must affirmatively integrate, as they later 
said in Swann, or earlier in the Green case.12 
There is nothing in here that said that; there is nothing in 
here that excludes it. As the Court and the country began deal-
ing with the issue of desegregation, it became apparent that you 
wouldn't have desegregation or desegregation would not bring 
about an end to segregation unless it was affirmative integration. 
That was in the Swann case. 
Thurgood [Marshall], in arguing one of the cases, was asked, 
I think by Justice [Felix] Frankfurter, "How he would assign the 
kids to the schools?" [Marshall] said, "Well, just draw a line and 
kids will go to the school nearest them." And if you wanted to 
set up any standard of sorting them out you can let the smart 
Black kids go to school with smart white kids, and dumb Black 
kids go to school with dumb white kids. In fact, I wrote a book in 
which I said something like that.IJ And I was attacked with that 
argument later on. My answer was [that], and I think it was a 
valid answer. If I knew then what I know now, I never would 
have said it. 
RS: Where in the Brown decision, or for that matter, any of the 
other decisions, does the Court make a definitive statement say-
ing that "separate but equal" violates the 14th Amendment be-
cause it's inherently a conflict with the idea of equal protection? 
JG: It says it obliquely. It said, "In the field of education 'sepa-
rate but equal' has no place." That's what it said. And people 
have wondered why the Court said that rather vaguely. And I'm 
not quite sure [why] they did that. I don't know that there was 
some conscious motivation behind it. You know if somebody said 
to [Chief Justice Earl] Warren, don't you think you ought to put 
it the other way? He might have said yes. I don't think he would 
have had a reason for him to do that. It was the necessary impli-
cation of what he said that segregation was unconstitutional. 
In fact, they demonstrated that's what it meant to them, be-
cause simultaneously they struck down segregation in parks and 
a few other places where the concept of separate but equal hav-
ing a negative effect on education was really irrelevant. There 
were a couple of teachings that said the same thing. They were 
12. Green v. New Kent County Board of Education, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
13. See Jack Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law (Columbia U. Press, 
1959). 
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reversed on the basis of Brown v. Board of Education. So they 
knew what it meant. Why did they put it the way they did, I 
don't know. I don't think it's ever been explained. Sometimes 
there's no reasonable explanation for a lot of things. 
RS: On what basis was Brown decided; was it law or social sci-
ence? Does the Court in Brown or other decisions come up with 
a definitive statement of why segregation is inherently a violation 
of 14th Amendment equal protection? 
JG: In other words, do they spin out a rationale? Certainly in 
the later cases. In fact, in cases they're writing today on affirma-
tive action, they talk about stigmatization. That's all that affirma-
tive action cases talk about: stigma is a fundamental principle. 
RS: That's once again, more in the social realm, than in legal, 
constitutional realm. 
JG: I disagree with that. The reason I disagree with that is if you 
look at the earliest cases ... Strauder v. West Virginia [1880]14 is 
the earliest case statement of the articulation of that. It was all 
on stigma. And the word [in] social science hadn't been invented 
for another 50 years. They say that they didn't employ stigma, 
but [that was a] different brand of stigma. They say that if you 
say Black, people were associated with stigma. They understood 
back then that when you say [segregation], it associates Black 
people [who] were stigmatized with a brand. The majority recog-
nized that. All they were saying again now in Brown was what 
they said in Strauder. 
RS: But in terms of the attack on Brown v. Board of Education 
[then], or even the attack today, without the Court's articulating 
a statement that equal protection under the 14th Amendment 
must mean equal, which constitutes integrated facilities, there 
isn't the kind of legal, constitutional basis that people, who are 
opposed to the use of social science or even opposed to equal 
protection, have to stare in the face and say: "Here's an argu-
ment that puts that position in a forceful manner." And I think 
that's a missing link ... 
JG: The people who criticize the Brown v. Board of Education 
decision, some of them wrote their own version of Brown. Lou 
Pollak wrote and other people wrote about lessons of Brown v. 
Board of Education.1s And my guess is you could criticize the 
14. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880). 
15. See Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to 
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959). 
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hell out of the decision. There's really no way of writing some-
thing that satisfies everybody. And I think now we can see a lot 
of defects in the [decision] and which explicitly overruled Plessy 
and left open the possibility of the attack on the social sciences. 
The equal protection clause has always been interpreted in terms 
of what we call social science. That's something about Strauder. 
The term "badges of servitude" was something that was used in 
the debates over the 13th [1865] and 14th [1868] Amendments. 
When people thought about equality back then, they didn't mean 
mathematical equality, they meant equality of the ways they 
lived their lives and pointed out the term "badges of servitude" 
was something that was [obvious]. That's all Brown was talking 
about. And it wasn't very oblique. It was to open up society. 
Student: What would you say to claims that both Plessy and 
Brown v. Board of Education were wrong in that they both drew 
from social psychological theories which many argue are outside 
the bounds of legal jurisprudence? 
JG: I would say neither of them was wrong in that sense. I think 
Plessy was wrong in the conclusion it came to. It's impossible for 
courts to decide cases without some recognition of what goes on 
in the world around them. For example, Strauder v. West Virginia 
said that separating Blacks stigmatized them. All Plessy said was 
separating Blacks did not. But if you have a system of social or-
ganization decreed by law and its purpose is essentially to deni-
grate one part of the community on the basis of race, I think the 
court has to acknowledge that and deal with it. 
Student: Doesn't that open the door for things like that which 
happened in Stelfi6 where each side starts parading its experts? 
What happened in Stell was clearly ridiculous, but doesn't Brown 
v. Board of Education set the stage for that? 
JG: Yes, if you view what Brown v. Board of Education did in a 
spurious way. Again, there were no expert witnesses in Strauder. 
There were no expert witnesses in Plessy. There were expert wit-
nesses in Brown v. Board of Education. You notice how the 
Court deals with them. It essentially says, "They corroborate 
what we happen to know." 
The Court has to have a view of the world. The Court has to 
know that if you sit somebody down in a room and you ask them 
to confess to a crime in the presence of the electric chair, that has 
16. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, 220 F. Supp 667 (S.D. 
Ga. 1963); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 
1964). 
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a coercive effect. I had a case like that.n They questioned this 
guy, and they questioned him, and then he wouldn't answer the 
question, and they brought him in and sat him down next to the 
electric chair and he confessed to the crime. Well, they didn't 
have a psychiatrist psychoanalyze him. We know the way the 
world works. This was coercive. And they make these judg-
ments all the time. 
As [Charles] Black points out in his article, "A court may 
advise itself of [things] as it advises itself of the facts that we are a 
'religious people,' that the country's more industrialized than in 
Jefferson's day, that children are natural objects of fathers' 
bounty, that criminal sanctions are commonly thought to deter, 
that steel is the basic commodity in our economy, that the impu-
tation of unchastity is harmful to a woman."ts Courts make 
those judgments all the time when they were making rules of 
thought. So that's all they were doing now. The expert witnesses 
in the case really threw the whole thing off track in a way be-
cause people then started backing the expert witnesses rather 
than the quite clear concept that segregation denigrated Black 
people. 
But I think it's unavoidable. You'd have to argue that that's 
an incorrect conclusion. You couldn't say courts can't make 
judgments about the way the world works. You could say they 
make the wrong judgments; there's no evidence for that judg-
ment. The evidence is to the contrary. You can't say you can't 
make judgments about the way the world works. 
Student: What about leaving social psychology out of the 
decision? 
JG: But you leave social psychology out in a formal academic 
sense. But you're making judgments about the way people react 
to how they're treated. It's unavoidable. John W. Davis in the 
school cases made this argument, which was a tactical error on 
his part in which he said, "I'm reminded of a story of Aesop's 
fable about the dog which walked across a stream. He had a 
bone in his mouth and he saw a bone in the water, and he went 
for the bone in the water, and lost both that bone and he didn't 
get the one in the water." And Davis said, "And I advise my 
Negro friends that they shouldn't throw away everything they 
have on a fancy issue of prestige." (p. 190) 
17. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957). 
18. See Black, 69 Yale LJ. at 426 (cited in note 11). 
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And Davis made a big rhetorical mistake, because Thurgood 
got up, and he said, "Mr. Davis talked like people wanted this 
prestige, wanted the same prestige white people had." (p. 190) 
Now prestige is not something capable of being described in a 
scientifically, precise way. But I think we would all agree that 
what Black people wanted [was] to be perceived as the same as 
white people. The law ought not be putting them in a serious 
deficit. Now what happened was we called in social psychologists 
to bolster that, and it was persuasive in some cases, but it was 
also a big fat target for attack in others. Because social psychol-
ogy is not rocket science. 
RS: The issue that began this discussion was whether the deci-
sion was on an issue of constitutional principles or whether it was 
ultimately decided on social science. And whether some of the 
attacks on Brown v. Board of Education would have been less 
persuasive had the decision been more clearly on constitutional 
principle, and less clearly on social science. 
JG: People speculated about that and a number of law profes-
sors have written articles called, "Brown v. Board of Education: 
A Revised Opinion." They've done that about other famous 
cases like Shelley v. Kramer.19 Lou Pollak wrote an article which 
was his opinion.zo He didn't have the social scientific testimony' 
in there. But Brown v. Board of Education did have the concepts 
which are unavoidable and you must deal with. Because if you 
say it doesn't really affect Black people if they stand separate, 
then you've got to address why it doesn't affect them because 
everybody looks and knows damn well that it has to be affecting 
them. 
RS: My next question is about implementation. I'm curious 
what you think was the impact on the Court of the somewhat 
opaque endorsement by the Eisenhower administration of hop-
ing the Court would strike down segregation? (p. 191) What im-
pact did that have on the case and the Court? 
JG: The Truman administration had written a brief in Sweatt and 
McLaurin and Hendersonz1 in which it said segregation must go. 
And they gave all the reasons for it-the historical reasons and 
to some extent foreign policy reasons and the reasons in the 
realm of political science and constitutional history. In the first 
Brown v. Board of Education case, the Truman administration 
19. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
20. See Pollak, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 24-30 (cited in note 16). 
21. Henderson v. U.S., 339 U.S. 816 (1950). 
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filed a brief which said, "We've already taken this position in 
Sweatt and McLaurin." Then the Eisenhower administration 
came in and the people in the Solicitor General's office were the 
same, at least the staff was, not the Solicitor General, but they 
didn't know what Eisenhower was going to do about it. So they 
filed a brief which they called a supplemental brief, rather than a 
new brief, which essentially was a continuation of the position 
they'd taken earlier. Either nobody paid attention to it or it was 
accepted. 
Eisenhower's Attorney General was [Herbert] Brownell 
who is still around today [d. 1996], and was a thoroughly decent 
fellow on these issues, and certainly is the person who moved 
[Eisenhower] to do the "right thing" in the Little Rock school 
case.zz If you see how it might have gotten to the President obvi-
ously through the Attorney General, at that stage when it was a 
matter of relatively low visibility. Certainly nothing like it was 
after the second argument of 1955. They weren't going to chal-
lenge what had happened. 
RS: But you still had to elicit exactly what the Justice Depart-
ment's position was. (p. 191) And you indicated breathing a sigh 
of relief that they articulated it ... 
JG: That's right. I think it was [Assistant Attorney General] Lee 
Rankin who argued that point. Rankin was again an absolutely 
marvelous lawyer who believed exactly as we believed. But be-
cause there was to the cogniscenti a bit of ambiguity in the gov-
ernment's brief because it merely said it was a supplemental brief 
and not changing its position. So it was a stealth kind of way of 
doing it. Some people were wondering, "Was the government 
willing to articulate a position, to stand up for it?" And obvi-
ously the question did not take the government by surprise. 
They knew the question would come and the answer was 
forthright.23 
RS: What impact do you think the government's support of your 
position, born in the Truman administration but [continued in] 
the Eisenhower administration, had on the Supreme Court's 
decision? 
JG: It was enormously influential. I mean the Court doesn't 
want to be out there alone. Sometimes it is. If you just look at 
other points in history. I think the fact that we won the Dela-
22. Little Rock school case: Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
23. Greenberg. Crusaders in the Courts at 191 (cited in note 3) ("segregation in pub-
lic schools cannot be maintained under the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
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ware case in the lower courts was very influential.z4 If you look 
to the death penalty, the Court held the death penalty unconsti-
tutional in 1972 in part because the Supreme Court of California 
held it unconstitutional earlier that same year. The court of ap-
peals in the 4th circuit [did so too] in another case. (p. 45Q)zs 
And some of the justices now explain the 1972 decision in terms 
of that. Particularly if you are dealing with a major series of 
events, along with the possibility of a major national revolution, 
what the Solicitor General thinks is heavily important. During 
the sit-ins, there [were] things in the sit-in cases. There is all 
kinds of debate back and forth about what the Solicitor General 
really means, what his position is. So if the government had not 
been with us, we would have possibly not won those cases. 
RS: I think that what happens in the Little Rock case later be-
comes important, because Little Rock gives an example of both 
the kind of forthrightness and forward motion that the govern-
ment would have to take to see desegregation implemented 
quickly. 
JG: Let me step back a little bit because Eisenhower did not like 
the [Brown] decision. He is reputed to have said several times 
that the worst thing he ever did was to have appointed Earl War-
ren. And when it came to the government's position on imple-
mentation as we see in the 1955 decision, Eisenhower himself, 
wrote that part of the brief. There's a law review article by 
Victor Kramer-! have it on my desk as a matter of fact-which 
has a facsimile of the brief, and it shows Eisenhower's handwrit-
ing in the margin.z6 Eisenhower actually wrote in that we're 
dealing with a part of the country that's long been accustomed to 
these kinds of arrangements, and we have to go about it sensi-
tively over a period of time. (p. 204) 
RS: But my point is that Eisenhower knew as a former military 
officer that if he was going to get implementation in Little Rock, 
he had to send a show of force. [JG: Yes). This is not a lesson 
that was learned by everybody who wanted to see this 
implemented. 
JG: That's right, but there were very few, what you might call, 
provocations, in those days. Little Rock was rare in that it was 
24. Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Chane. 1952). 
25. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 
1972); Ralph v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970). 
26. Victor H. Kramer, President Eisenhower's Handwritten Changes in the Brief on 
Relief in the School Segregation Cases: Minding the Whys and Wherefores, 9 Const. 
Comm. 223 (1992). 
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one of the few places where integration was attempted in an area 
of high resistance. There was one episode like that in Delaware; 
there were a couple episodes in Kentucky, one in Tennessee; a 
couple others, but nothing reached the level that Little Rock 
did-having the government call out the National Guard, essen-
tially where the Supreme Court was involved. These other cases 
were just in the lower courts and so forth. 
RS: You say in the book that this [Brown] decision was "the 
most important Supreme Court decision of the century, maybe 
ever." (p. 197) I'm interested in you articulating your feelings 
on that. 
JG: I'll tell you. Who is the best soprano, who's the best tennis 
player, who's the best quarterback? Any one of those questions 
you can say any three different people qualify. So you can put 
this up with Marbury v. Madisonz7 ... 
But I'm putting a gloss on the term. To say someone is the 
best baritone or the best tenor, you're saying that you have to 
acknowledge that there are maybe three or four others who also 
qualify for that. But I would say that along with Marbury v. 
Madison, that's about the only one that occurs to me as a con-
tender for equal status. 
RS: Why? 
JG: We had slavery. And followed by slavery was the Black 
Codes which tried to keep it. And then we had racial segrega-
tion, which essentially kept Black people pretty close to slavery. 
They weren't voting, they weren't going to school, they weren't 
participating in society at all. And Brown v. Board of Education 
changed it all. That changed the whole status of Black people in 
America, which was quite apart from the all moral and other 
questions that 10 to 12 percent of the people who were being 
kept in a status of subjugation. Also it gave rise to a view of the 
whole civil rights, civil liberties, personal freedom movement 
which went on for about the next 20 years, but which is now 
under fierce attack. (p. 461) And it went beyond. The whole 
rights of women, for example, were clearly tied to Brown v. 
Board of Education and all the other issues of personal freedom 
for other groups. 
RS: What do you think would have happened to desegregation 
and integration in this county if there had not been a decision? 
Or if the Brown decision had been a narrow decision? 
27. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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JG: I don't want to keep coming back to the book, but I start off 
by saying, I thought of writing a novel about that, and I sort of 
outline the novel. (p. 12) I'll tell you what would have hap-
pened, probably. This is a pretty good guess. The South wasn't 
all bad. There were southern white liberals. There were Black 
militants, and in some areas there was a little bit of progress. But 
for example, in Delaware and Washington, DC, you still couldn't 
just go into a restaurant, you couldn't go any place. In Washing-
ton, DC, it was Union Station and the Y[MCA], and in Delaware 
it was Union Station and the Y. But there were people who 
wanted to do things. So you have a few instances of private col-
leges, generally not places that were well known, prestigious 
places, which took in a few Blacks. And you probably would 
have had some places that were inclined to take them in larger 
numbers. 
To the extent that that became visible, it would have stirred 
up the same kinds of provocations that we had when we started 
desegregating the schools. You would have had that in a few 
border states-Kentucky, Eastern Tennessee, Delaware, maybe 
some parts of Maryland, maybe some parts of Arkansas. That 
was about it. Those voluntary movements would have been sup-
pressed by the same kind of racism that attacked people trying to 
integrate schools in the school cases. And that would have then 
stirred up the militants who were Black and some of their white 
friends to more aggressive action, and you would have had a situ-
ation over time developing into something like we have in North-
ern Ireland. Because people just wouldn't take it any longer and 
there would have been civil unrest and civil disobedience. And 
there would have been no legal mechanism to cope with that be-
cause it would have been outside the scope of the law to change 
things about this. Legislatures weren't going to do anything. 
There weren't any Blacks in any of the legislatures. So I think 
that that's what would have happened. 
aRS: We've talked a little bit about what would have happened 
if Brown had not occurred ... 
JG: That's the novel I never wrote. 
RS: What about if Brown had occurred, but the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had not been passed? 
What would your vision be of the situation? 
JG: It would be similar to that first story. I think that because 
you wouldn't have had the political revolution we had. Blacks 
were beginning to vote. The Southern political defense of segre-
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gation crumbled as a result. You would have had Martin Luther 
King carrying on as he did in Selma, Birmingham, and so forth. 
It's obvious that the South wouldn't give in. Some busi-
nesses did. It's just hard to say really. I'd have to reflect on that 
a little bit. In Birmingham, King was able to hammer out a set-
tlement with some of the businesses, to desegregate their stores 
and so forth. They would have been having a convulsion that 
went on for another ten years, maybe another generation. There 
would have been, you know, civil disobedience, a lot of 
disruption. 
RS: How would you weigh the positives and the negatives of the 
Brown decision? How do you see its overall impact on society? 
Some people argued before Brown and even after Brown that 
there were negative impacts on Blacks in terms of job loss, that 
some of the resources that have gone into desegregation might 
have been better put into equalization. How do you sum up, 
over time, the impact of Brown v. Board of Education? 
JG: Brown v. Board of Education itself was absolutely indispen-
sable. Its impact was nothing but good. Bad things happened 
after Brown, but they didn't happen because of Brown, they were 
happening anyway. Some Black teachers lost jobs, that's true. A 
lot of Black teachers lost jobs. Black principals lost jobs. Over a 
period of time that's all been reversed. I know very few people 
who lost jobs and stayed out of jobs, but they had to move to jobs 
somewhere else. The impact of Brown v. Board of Education is 
said, by some economic analysis by Richard Freeman [to have] 
created a demand for Black teachers in the North which had 
never existed before. So actually the total number of Black 
teachers overall was greater. And, of course, there was a lot of 
opposition to the fact that Black people were asserting them-
selves in ways which had not been permitted, had not been 
tolerated. 
There's a theory being propounded rather vigorously which 
sort of astonishes me, because when I heard it the first time I 
thought it was nonsense, a book written by Gerald Rosenberg 
who teaches at the University of Chicago. And it's called "The 
Hollow Hope. "28 And he argues that Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion didn't accomplish anything. That we didn't have school de-
segregation until the Department of Justice started integrating 
schools in the '60s. I met him and I said, that just is so preposter-
28. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change? (U. of Chicago Press, 1991). 
1997] EXPERIENCES AND REFLECTIONS 363 
ous. The Department of Justice couldn't do anything until the 
Civil Rights Acts [e.g., 1964] were passed. The Civil Rights Acts 
were passed solely in response to the civil rights movement, and 
the civil rights movement was a direct outgrowth of Brown v. 
Board of Education. He denied that. But there's all sorts of evi-
dence-the sit-in demonstrations and the Freedom Rides were 
launched on the anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, the 
sit-in demonstrators all said they were inspired by Brown v. 
Board of Education ... And even if you didn't know that, you'd 
know how they followed each other. 
But in any event, the reason I say this is being propagated 
vigorously, and I can only think the reason it's being done is as 
an argument against judicial activism, an argument against an-
other Brown v. Board of Education. Because I had a student 
come to me who said he went to a lecture of the Federalist Soci-
ety at Columbia [University], and somebody went there and gave 
a whole lecture on how Brown v. Board of Education didn't ac-
complish anything. The Rosenberg thesis is apparently one that's 
being advocated very vigorously for reasons that leave me totally 
puzzled. 
RS: Let me pursue a bit more [how you felt during the argu-
ments on Brown]. Particularly in terms of the question of exter-
nal and internal feelings or demonstration. Can you tell me how 
a younger Jack Greenberg felt standing on the steps of the 
Supreme Court with his colleagues? If you look at this picture 
right here [on the cover of Crusaders in the Courts], you're in the 
middle. You're the only person with his arms crossed. 
JG: Just looking at the people there, I'll tell you what I felt about 
them. I was pleased deeply to be in with Thurgood Marshall, 
who was identified as a great champion, a great personality. And 
the person, as I'm facing, to his left, is Louis Redding, who was a 
very dear friend. And Spottswood Robinson, two to my left, who 
I respected, a very impressive scholarly kind of person. I felt I 
was in good company. I liked being among them. Jim Nabrit 
was there also. But I liked the people I was with. I mean this 
was not one of those situations where you are doing something 
and you have misgivings, ambivalence, conflict. 
RS: But you look very nervous in this picture. You do not look 
at ease; you look like you're in some way uncomfortable. That's 
typically what it means when people cross their arms in front of 
themselves. 
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JG: Well, I can't remember this ... it's conceivable; I think there 
may be a simpler explanation: so everyone can fit in the picture, I 
got my arm out of the way.29 
RS: Do you remember how you felt being in the middle of the 
picture, being the only white person in the picture? 
JG: Well, I was the only white person, or one of the few white 
people. The other whites were not actually arguing, but they 
were associated with the case and the politics of the case. It's 
really strange. We never really thought of ourselves as white or 
them as Black. The racial consciousness that is so pervasive to-
day at least pretty prevalent was something that was never on 
any conscious level. I don't recall whether I said it in the book or 
not, very often the question would arise, "How many whites, how 
many blacks at the Legal Defense Fund?" And virtually you al-
ways had to count, because you didn't remember from one time 
to the next. So I knew I was one of only a few white people at 
the LDF, not anything to be concerned with ... 
RS: What about being the only Jewish person [in the picture]? 
JG: That's about the same. Actually, of the whites who were 
associated with at the Legal Defense Fund, virtually all were 
Jewish. Certainly I'd have to sit down and figure out who they 
were at the moment. Certainly Lou Pollak is. Poor Charlie 
Black. In fact, the point that Charlie Black makes is that he was 
the only [non-Jewish] white person who was actually in this 
whole thing. (p. 50) 
RS: Any truth or significance to that? 
J G: Historically, I think, certainly up to this point, Jews were 
marginalized in the legal profession. I know when I went to law 
school, as graduation approached, you contacted the placement 
office [about] Jewish firms or non-Jewish firms. And you were 
not supposed to waste your time going to the wrong kind of 
firms. Now, there was a tiny amount of cross-over. 
RS: Are there any questions about Brown that I haven't asked, 
that you could suggest today so we can get them on the record? 
JG: No, I put everything I know in [my book]. I might have left 
some things out inadvertently, but certainly nothing that would 
add on [significantly]. 
29. Author note: Before the first class meeting of my "Civil Rights and Social 
Change" course at Princeton, Jack Greenberg, the class preceptors, and myself were pho-
tographed outside the Woodrow Wilson School. Professor Greenberg's arms were 
crossed similarly. 
